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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT IN CALIFORNIA
By RIcHARD R. B. POWELL*
Iniroducion
POWERS of appointment were used with great frequency in Eng-
land during the 17th and 18th centuries.1 Chief Justice Lord Mans-
field died in 1793. In his will he thus explained why he had employed
powers of appointment in his dispositions:
Those who are nearest and dearest to me best know how to manage
and improve, and ultimately in their turn, to divide and subdivide,
the good things of this world which I commit to their care, according
to events and contingencies which it is impossible for me to foresee,
or trace through all the many labyrinths of time and chance.2
The flexibility of dispositions, and their moulding in the light of cir-
cumstances, which occur decades after the disposer has died, is still
the most powerful argument for a free use of powers of appointment.3
West of the Atlantic there was a great hiatus of time between
the English resort to powers, and the kindling interest in powers
recently to be observed. This is easily understood. In the early
decades of a new economy substantial accumulations of wealth are
slow to grow. It is also true that American conveyancers lacked both
the finesse and the technical training common among their English
brethren. In consequence the decisions of American courts concern-
ing powers of appointment were extremely few in number down to
1900.4
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
This article was prepared to provide the California Law Revision Com-
mission with background information for its study of this subject. The
opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the article are en-
tirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the
opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the California Law Revision
Commission.
I E. SUGDEN, A PRAcTIcAL TREATIS E OF POWERs (7th ed. 1845), originally
published in 1823, contains 1234 pages of exposition as to their creation and
characteristics.
2 Quoted in Per Stirpes vs. Powers of Appointment, in THa BANK OF
CALIFORNIA, ESTATE PLANNING STUDIES 1 (Fall 1966).
8 The Bank of California, in the Fall of 1966, devoted an eight-page bul-
letin (cited in note 2 supra) to the "enormous possibilities of the power." The
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. devoted the whole of their monthly bul-
letin, TAxEs AND ESTATES, for January 1968, to Flexibility Through Powers of
Appointment.
4 Morffew v. San Francisco & S.R.R.R., 107 Cal. 587, 40 P. 810 (1895),
contains the only judicial reference to powers of appointment which this
writer has been able to find in California reports down to 1900.
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So long as Californians with large accumulations of wealth were
rare, and so long as gift and death taxes were absent, or low in per-
centage, a failure to use powers of appointment was of little prac-
tical importance. Both of these facts have been changing rapidly in
recent decades. This state now counts among its citizens a very large
number of wealthy individuals; and both gift and death taxes, both
state and federal, have long since ceased to be "low in percentage."
Future dispositions of large fortunes require full awareness of any
available device which gives added flexibility and of any available
device which can minimize the tax-bite. Powers of appointment
serve both of these ends.5 Lawyers whose work includes the drafting
of wills or trusts have a responsibility to their clients to assure that
the dispositions made will have the maximum in flexibility and the
minimum of tax-loss, consistent with the desires of the client and
with safety.
California lawyers have been most hesitant in using powers of
appointment. This attitude was wholly understandable, and wholly
justified, while it remained uncertain whether the law of California
permitted powers of appointment. That uncertainty was eliminated
by 1935. 6 The hesitance has, however, continued with only a slight
abatement, from 1935 down to date. This presents the problem to
which this study is devoted.
It is, perhaps, useful to begin with an exposition of the positions
heretofore taken by the courts of California as to the law governing
powers of appointment;7 to continue with an exposition of the statu-
tory ingredient in the California law as to powers of appointment; s
to present the reasons urging the enactment of a statute, fairly in-
clusive in scope, setting forth the "California common law" on powers
of appointment; 9 to follow these three general presentations, with a
detailed consideration of the specific rules which will work best with
respect to the rights of creditors of the donee of a general power,10
5 The tax-saving factor works thus: suppose that A has $500,000 of as-
sets at his death; that A wills these assets to B as trustee to pay the income
to A's widow C for life; thereafter to pay the income in equal shares to
A's children, D, E and F, for their several lives; then, on the death of each
child, to distribute the corpus of each child's share to such relatives of the
life tenant child by blood or marriage as the life tenant child shall appoint
by will. There is no escaping the federal estate tax or the California inher-
itance tax which becomes payable on A's death; but the nongeneral character
of the power of appointment conferred on D, E and F excludes the appointive
assets, from their respective estates. One generation is thus skipped for
federal tax purposes; and like results can be obtained under the California
inheritance tax as to all powers of appointment created since 1935.
6 See text accompanying notes 14-27 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 15-56 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 58-75 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 82-90 infra.
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and in favoring exclusive or nonexclusive powers." These last two
points deal with matters in which wisdom may well dictate a moderii-
zation of the ancient common law. Lastly it is vital to present a
tentative form of statute which is designed to accomplish the desired
ends.12 Those concerned with the clarity and serviceability of our cur-
rent law can then make such suggestions as are dictated by their
experiences, to the end that the statute finally presented to the legis-
lature for enactment can be the best that can be evolved to meet
the current needs of this great state.
Positions Heretofore Taken by the Courts of California, as to
Powers of Appointment
The early statute of 1850, adopting, in general, the common law
was incorporated into the Political Code as section 4468,' s and is
now present, with no change of substance in California Civil Code
section 22.2.14 This statute has been claimed to establish in Califor-
nia the common law as to powers of appointment for the period of
1850-1872. If it did, the law so established was a "paper law," be-
cause there are no decisions or other records which indicate that any-
one sought to create a power of appointment in California prior to
1872. It is, nevertheless, indisputable that the statute of 1850 fur-
nished the commonly accepted background for the controversy as to
the consequences of California legislation in 1872 and 1874.
The pervasive influence of the New York Field Code on the
California statutes of 1872 needs no discussion at this time. As a
part of that influence, California adopted a statute containing 62
sections concerning powers of appointment, 5 modeled on the New
York Revised Statutes of 1830. The complexity of these provisions,
plus a complete lack of any awareness of the possibilities of powers,
caused California to do in 2 years what New York required 135 years
to accomplish. In 1874, as a part of its "cleanup of the 'excesses of
1 See text accompanying notes 91-96 infra.
12 See Appendix A.
Is Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 95, at 219.
14 CAL. Cxv. COD. § 22.2 states:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant [to] or in-
consistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or
laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State."
This section was added by Cal. Stats. 1951, ch. 655, § 1, at 1833, and was
derived from Cal. Pol. Code § 4468, Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 95, at 219 (repealed
1951).
To any having historical interests, see 1 Cal. 588-604 (1850), which con-
tains the Report of the Senate Judiciary Comm., dated February 27, 1850,
narrating the struggle in the legal profession as to whether California should
have the "common law" or the "civil law." This report resulted in Cal. Pol.
Code § 4468, Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 95, at 219 (repealed 1951).
15 Cal. Civ. Code of 1872, §§ 878-940 (repealed 1874).
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1872,'" the California Legislature repealed the entire group of 62 sec-
tions.'
6
This 1874 repeal of the statute of 1872 raised a very basic ques-
tion. Did the adoption of the New York statutory system of pow-
ers, in 1872, followed by the complete repeal of these provisions in
1874, leave California with its prior common law as to powers, or
leave California with no law whatever permitting and regulating pow-
ers of appointment?
Estate of Fair,17 in 1901, by a 4-to-3 decision took the position
that the 1874 repeal left California with none of its common law on
powers. During the next 34 years California courts manifested great
hesitance in accepting the common law on this topic. In Estate of
Dunphy'1 the supreme court sidestepped the basic question in 1905.
By finding that remainders created in named persons were vested,
and that the claimed powers to appoint had never been exercised, the
case was decided without any decision on the lawfulness in California
of powers. There was, however, a dictum that powers of appointment
were permissible; and this dictum was in the opinion written by Jus-
tice McFarland who had been one of the four judges finding powers
in trust nonexistent in Estate of Fair,19 4 years before. In Gray v.
Union Trust Co.,20 the desired termination of a trust was refused in
1915 by finding the created remainders vested, whether the attempted
divesting power of appointment was good or bad. Again there was
a dictum,21 that a reserved power of appointment was "probably
valid." In Estate of Murphy22 the supreme court, in 1920, happily
announced that the same result would flow from either finding no
valid power of appointment to have been created, or finding an effec-
tive exercise of a validly created power. Thus again the basic ques-
tion was left unanswered. In Estate of McCurdy,23 in 1925, the death
of the named donee before the death of the testator-donor relieved
the supreme court from the necessity of passing on the permissibility,
in California, of powers of appointment. The court said:
16 Cal. Stats. 1873-1874, ch. 612, § 123, at 223. This statute was approved
April 30, 1874, and became effective July 1, 1874.
A similar result in New York was reached by .ch. 864, §§ 1-2, [1964] N.Y.
Laws 2322, effective June 1, 1965 (drawn by the writer of this article).
'7 132 Cal. 523, 537, 64 P. 1000 (1901). The dissent by Temple, J., con-
curred in by Harrison, J., and Beatty, C.J., later became accepted California
law. See text accompanying, notes 28-29 infra.
18 147 Cal. 95, 81 P. 315 (1905).
19 See note 17 supra.
20 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306. (1915).
21 Id. at 642, 154 P. at 309: 'There is in this trust a power of appoint-
ment or nomination reserved to the trustor." This statement was in no way
necessary to the decision.
22 182 Cal. 740, 190 P. 46 (1920).
28 197 Cal. 276, 240 P. 498 .(1925).
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We are not concerned with the question whether or not powers of
appointment are valid in this state, since the repeal by the legisla-
ture in 1874 of the title in the Civil Code relating to powers .... 24
As long as the supreme court of the state avoided an outright
overruling of the 4-to-3 decision in Estate of Fair,2 5 informed lawyers
were wise not to subject their clients to possible litigation by insert-
ing powers of appointment in dispositive instruments. This continued
to be the discouraging situation until 1935.2
6
Estate of Sloan,27 in 1935, adopted the. position argued by the
three dissenters in Estate of Fair;25 decided that the 1874 statute
did not abrogate "the common law of powers"; and declared:
the whole question is solved whenever it is determined what the com-
mon law rule is.20
Unfortunately, the acceptance, for California, of the "common
lav' as to powers, did not settle all of the problems facing lawyers in
this field. What is the common law on powers of appointment?
Some learned in the history of the law remember the preface to the
Proposed Civil Code (at iii), written by the Commissioners on Octo-
ber 2, 1871. This preface reads:
Our Act adopting the Common Law of England (Stats. 1850, 219)
is as follows: "The Common Law of England, so far as it is not re-
pugnant to, or inconsistent with, the Constitution of the United
States, or the Constitution or laws of the State of California, shall be
the rule of decision in all the Courts of this State." The Courts hold
that this Act does not mean Common Law of England, but of the
United States--"American Common Law;" the Common Law of Eng-
land, as modified by the respective States. There are as many au-
thoritative modifications as there are States in the Union. Rules upon
the same subject differ much in different States. When they so dif-
fer, or when they need modifications to suit our conditions, the
Court, not the Legislature, establishes the law.
The potential babel of the 50, possibly discordant, voices has caused
the lawyers of California to continue hesitant in using powers of ap-
pointment. This same problem, i.e. what is the common law on pow-
ers of appointment, engaged the efforts of those of us working on the
24 Id. at 286, 240 P. at 502.
25 See note 17 supra.
2 0 A careful search has revealed only one opinion prior to 1935, basing
its result on the effective exercise of a general testamentary power. This is
the lower appellate court opinion of Reed v. Hollister, 44 Cal. App. 533, 186
P. 819 (1919).
27 7 Cal..App. 2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935).
28 See note 17 supra.
29 7 Cal. App. 2d at 332, 46 P.2d at 1013 (emphasis added).. This state-
ment is, of course, subject to the qualification that the commbn law of- powers
prevails in California, except as it has been modified by statute. As to these
statutory modifications, see text accompanying notes 61-75 infra.
Reiterating the controlling force of the common law on powers in Cal-
ifornia (since 1935), see Estate of Elston, 32 Cal. App. 2d 652, 90 P.2d 608
(1939); Estate of Huntington, 10 .Misc.- 2d 932, 170 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sur. Ct.
1957) (New York case resting its decision on California law).
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Restatement of Property, during the 5 years between 1935 and 1940.
Professor W. Barton Leach of Harvard became the Special Reporter
for the topic Powers of Appointment. With the advice and counsel
of the judges, practitioners and law professors 0 of the country, a
chapter 25 of the Restatement of Property containing 51 sections,
and occupying 237 printed pages, was published in 1940. Herein, for
the first time in American jurisprudence, could be found the har-
monizing of discordant voices in the nonstatutory law of powers,
with a considered choice as between conflicting rules. It never was
intended to be accepted in toto, and without inquiry, as the law of
California or of any other state. It merely provides the embodiment
of 1940 wisdom of a group of specialists, which the courts of any
state are free to follow or to modify. It does, however, indicate the
diversities of the commonly litigated problems raised when powers
of appointment are commonly employed.
A careful combing of the California reports reveals not only the
seven cases above discussed, which culminated in the acceptance of
the common law of powers as the California law,31 but some 13 other
cases3 2 dealing with specific problems in the law of powers, and an
additional group of cases furnishing analogies possibly applicable to
powers.33 The 13 specific holdings cover (a) the validity of a discre-
tionary power to fix the shares of five takers; 34 (b) the validity of a
special power presently exercisable, and the taxability under the
California inheritance law of the appointive assets separately from
an outright gift made to the donee;35 (c) the sufficiency of circum-
stantial evidence to prove the exercise of a general testamentary power
as to bank stock, plus the more important holding that an inter
vivos agreement made by the donee cannot be effective to exercise a
testamentary power;36 (d) the ease of creating a power by combining
the inferences based on separate facts;37 (e) the lawfulness of the ex-
ercise of a general testamentary power created inter vivos in 1930, by
30 Dean Orrin K. McMurray of Berkeley was then a member of the In-
stitute's Council. The group doing the research, and working on its accurate
expression, included two persons, then and now distinguished Professors of
Property Law at Harvard, namely A. James Casner and W. Barton Leach,
plus four who are presently on the Faculty of Hastings College of the Law,
namely, Everett Fraser (emeritus), J. Warren Madden, Richard R. Powell
and Lewis M. Simes.
31 See text accompanying notes 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28 supra.
32 See text accompanying notes 34-46 infra.
83 See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra.
34 Estate of Davis, 13 Cal. App. 2d 64, 56 P.2d 584 (1936).
35 Estate of Elston, 32 Cal. App. 2d 652, 90 P.2d 608 (1939).
36 Childs v. Cross, 41 Cal. App. 2d 680, 107 P.2d 424 (1940). This case
applies the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 340 (1940) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT].
37 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Ogilvie, 47 Cal. App. 2d 787, 119 P.2d 25
(1941). This is the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 323.
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a will executed in 1929;38 (f) the inclusion of the appointive assets
in the gross estate of a donee of a general power presently exercisable,
for the purposes of the federal estate tax when the power was exer-
cised in 1932;3 9 (g) the existence of "fraud on the power" which
caused the exercise to fail when the donee of a special power at-
tempted to divert some of the appointive assets to a person outside
the permissible group of appointees; 40 (h) the ability of a donee-
testator to prevent the proration of the federal estate tax, under the
exception embodied in California Probate Code section 970;41 (i) the
taking of the appointive assets by the takers in default named by
the donor of the power to whatever extent the donee fails effectively
to exercise his power;42 (j) the nonexercisability of a testamentary
power by an inter vivos act; 43 (k) the fact that an equitable life inter-
est under a trust plus a special testamentary power to appoint is
not the equivalent of ownership; 44 (1) the ease of creating a power
by combining the inferences based on separate facts; 45 (m) the deter-
mination of the validity, under the Rule Against Perpetuities, of the
exercise of a general testamentary power by applying the permissible
period from the creation of the power, but taking into account the
circumstances which exist when the power is exercised.
48
In assessing the 20 California decisions thus far discussed, three
conclusions are justified. In the first place, the California cases thus
far decided cover only a very small fraction of the problems dealt
with by the common law as exemplified in the 237 printed pages of
chapter 25 of the Restatement of Property. In the second place, on
38 California Trust Co. v. Ott, 59 Cal. App. 2d 715, 140 P.2d 79 (1943).
This is the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 344.
39 Henderson v. Rogan, 159 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1947). This result would
presently occur under the current provisions of INT. REv. CoDE or 1954,
§ 2041(a).
40 Horne v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1948). This
is the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 353.
41 Estate of Parker, 98 Cal. App. 2d 393, 220 P.2d 580 (1950).
42 Estate of Baird, 120 Cal. App. 2d 219, 260 P.2d 1052 (1953); 135 Cal.
App. 2d 333, 287 P.2d 365 (1955).
This is a small part of the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 365. It has
the practical merit of decreasing the costs of settling the donee's estate.
43 Briggs v. Briggs, 122 Cal. App. 2d 766, 265 P.2d 587 (1954). This is
the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 346 (a).
44 Estate of Smythe, 132 Cal. App. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 141 (1955).
45 Estate of Kuttler, 160 Cal. App. 2d 332, 325 P.2d 624 (1958). This is
the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 323.
46 Estate of Bird, 225 Cal. App. 2d 196, 37 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964). This
is the rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 392. It represents the growth of the
common law which began with Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 214, 120 N.E. 167
(1918), and has since been accepted as sound common law in the Fourth
Circuit and in Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania. The authorities are collected in 5 R. POWELL, REAL
PROPmETY, 11 788 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PowELL,].
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the points decided there is almost complete47 concurrence of the com-
mon law of California, as expounded by its courts, and of the common
law of the United States, as set forth in the Restatement of Property.
In the third place, Estate of Sloan,48 which, in 1935, rendered Califor-
nia the great service of establishing for this state the common law
on powers of appointment, also rendered this state a great disservice
in adopting the then already obsolete rule of the old common law,
namely a constructional preference for nonexclusive powers. 49 Here-
in, lies the danger of California's present position. On any litigation
concerning powers, lawyers and judges have to retrace the long and
arduous paths of research followed in the preparation of the Restate-
ment of Property. This takes time of lawyers, and that means it
requires large 'expenditures of clients' funds. It also takes much time
of our judges. All this could be at least minimized by the enactment
of a statute declaring the "California common law of powers."
The possibly useful analogies based on California cases not in-
volving powers of appointment establish (a) equity's willingness to
correct a defective exercise of a trustee's power to mortgage;15 or (b)
of a power of attorney; 51 (c) the nondelegability of a discretionary
power to sell;52 a judicial astuteness in making constructions which
effect a giver's purposes;53 (d) the ending of a power to convey con-
ferred on two persons, when one of the two has died;5 4 (e) a sugges-
tion that an attempted exercise of a power of appointment in favor of
the takers in default is a nullity;5 5 (f) the inability to have a power to
amend the terms of a trust exercised. after the person having such
power becomes incompetent;5 6 and (g) the inability of one trustee to
exercise a power which was conferred on this one plus another.5 7
47 See text accompanying note 49 infra for the one area of divergence.
48 7 Cal. App. 2d 319, 47 P.2d 1007. This case is discussed in the text
accompanying note 27 supra.
49 In this case a special testamentary power to appoint to the donee's
heirs was held invalidly exercised because the donee appointed to one ma-
ternal aunt, who along with two paternal aunts were heirs of the donee at his
death. The constructional preference for nonexclusive powers had been de-
clared by English cases of 1853 and 1854, and by early decisions of Minnesota,
New Jersey, Virginia and West Virginia, and had been embalmed in Ruling
Case Law and Corpus Juris. The constructional preference for allowing the
donee full discretion to give, as he chooses, to one or more of the permissible
appointees (now embodied in RESTATEMENT § 360 and based on numerous
recent cases collected in 3 POWELL 398 nn.44-47) was, unfortunately, rejected.
50 Beatty v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11 (1862).
51 Gerdes v. Moody, 41 Cal. 335 (1871).
52 Saunders v. Webber, 39 Cal. 287 (1870).
5s Elmer v. Gray, 73 Cal. 283, 14 P. 862 (1887).
54 Burnett v. Piercy, 149 Cal. 178, 86 P. 603 (1906).
55 Estate of Murphy, 182 Cal. 740, 190 P. 46 (1920).
56 Swart v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 48 Cal. App. 2d 824, 120 P.2d 697
(1942).
57 Briggs v. Briggs, 122 Cal. App. 2d 766, 265 P.2d 587 (1954).
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Siaiutory Ingredient in the Law of California
on Powers of Appointment
Any general acceptance of the "common law" on a topic, is subject
to an exception covering the statutory deviations therefrom.
The statutory ingredients in the California law on powers con-
cern (a) the releasability of powers;58 (b) the exercise of a power by
a general disposition in the donee-decedent's will;59 and (c) the taxa-
tion of the appointive assets under both the federal estate tax60 and
the California inheritance tax.
61
The provisions of California Civil Code section 1060, making pow-
ers of appointment broadly releasable, were the fortunate product of
a nationwide situation. The Internal Revenue Act of 194262 had
changed the federal rule as to the taxing of appointive assets in the
gross estate of the donee. If the permissible appointees were re-
stricted to categories of persons listed in the statute, the appointive
assets were excluded. Many persons in the country had powers of
appointment not sufficiently restricted to gain the benefit of the 1942
legislation. There was a prevalent desire to curtail the broadness of
their powers so as to save taxes. The American law as to the re-
leasability of powers, especially as to a partial release which would
diminish the categories of permissible appointees, was in a high state
of uncertainty. In the year 1943, and shortly thereafter, a large
number of American states met this problem by enacting a statute on
releasability. California Civil Code section 1060 was enacted63 as a
58 See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
50 See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
60 State legislation cannot change the federal tax statutes.
01 See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
62 Ch. 619, § 403, 56 Stat. 942-44.
03 Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 318, § 1, at 777. The text of CAL. CIv. CODE § 1060
is as follows:
"1. Any power, which is exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or will,
or otherwise, whether general or special, other than a power in trust which
is imperative, is releasable, either with or without consideration, by written
instrument signed by the donee and delivered as hereinafter provided unless
the instrument creating the power provides otherwise.
"2. A power which is releasable may be released with respect to the
whole or any part of the property subject to such power and may also be
released in such manner as to reduce or limit the persons or objects, or classes
of persons or objects, in whose favor such powers would otherwise be exer-
cisable. No release of a power shall be deemed to make imperative a power
which was not imperative prior to such release, unless the instrument of re-
lease expressly so provides.
"3. Such release may be delivered to any of the following:
"(a) Any person specified for such purpose in the instrument creat-
ing the power.
"(b) Any trustee of the property to which the power relates.
"(c) Any person, other than the donee, who could be adversely af-
fected by an exercise of the power.
"(d) The county recorder of the county in which the donee resides,
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part of this movement. It is a soundly conceived and useful statute.
If, however, a general statute on powers of appointment is to be en-
acted there are two particulars in which the statute can be im-
proved. One involves only a matter of words. The present statute
excludes from releasability any "power in trust which is imperative."
The idea of this exclusion is sound. No change of substance would
be made if the words "in trust" were omitted. If a power is "impera-
tive" it is necessarily "in trust." A twice saying of the same thing
is not good statutory drafting. The second matter is more substan-
tial. California has correctly taken the position that a power created,
in terms, so as to be exercisable only by will, cannot be effectively
exercised by inter vivos conduct by the donee.64 The provisions of
California Civil Code section 1060, as they presently exist, permit this
rule of California (and of the common law) to be nullified. Suppose
that A creates a trust for the benefit of his wife B for life and also
confers on B a general testamentary power of appointment. B (un-
der present section 1060) can release this power as to all persons ex-
cept X, and can expressly specify in the release that her residual
power shall be imperative. B has, by inter vivos act fully exercised
the power, which the creator of the power intended to remain unex-
ercised until B's death. This possibility of using the statute to null-
ify the donor's intent would be prevented if there were added at the
end of the second paragraph of section 1060 (see its text in note 63)
the phrase, "nor shall any release of a power be permissible when
the effect of the release is an inter vivos exercise of a solely testa-
mentary power." With the two suggested changes, one purely
semantic, the other precautionary, California Civil Code section 1060
deserves to be retained as an integral part of any proposed new
statute on this topic.
California Probate Code section 125,65 dates back to the California
Statutes of 1850.66 It was probably borrowed from the similar pro-
or has a place of business, or in which the deed, will or other instrument
creating the power is filed, and from the time of filing the same for record,
notice is imparted to all persons of the contents thereof.
"4. All releases heretofore made which substantially comply with the
foregoing requirements are hereby validated. The enactment of this section
shall not impair, nor be construed to impair, the validity of any release here-
tofore made."
64 Childs v. Gross, 41 Cal. App. 2d 680, 107 P.2d 424 (1940); Briggs v.
Briggs, 122 Cal. App. 2d 766, 265 P.2d 587 (1954). This is also sound common
law. See RESTATEMIENT § 346 (a).
65 Its text is as follows:
"A devise or bequest of all the testator's real or personal property, in
express terms, or in any other terms denoting his intent to dispose of.all his
real or personal property, passes all the real or personal property which he
was entitled to dispose of by will at the time of his death, including property
embraced in a power to devise."
66 CAL. PROB. CODE § 125 was enacted by Cal. Stats. 1931, ch. 281, § 125,
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vision inserted in the New York Revised Statutes of 1830, and still
retained in New York.6 7  When the donee of a power, by his will,
has made a gift of the residue of his estate, or otherwise has mani-
fested an intent to pass all of his property, but has failed to mention
his power or the property subject thereto, the common law inference
was that he had failed to exercise the power.6 8 Thus the rule of
California Probate Code section 125 is the exact opposite of the com-
mon law rule. Some states have a statute applying the rule of Probate
Code section 125 only to general powers. The California statute led to
a complete frustration of the clearly provable intent of the donee
in Estate of Carter in 1956.69 The present statute provides an un-
desirable pitfall for the unwary. Wisconsin, faced with the same
problem in 1965, greatly qualified its prior acceptance of the New
York-California provision by restricting the rule to general powers
where no gift in default is found.70 In any general reworking of
the California law on powers, it is strongly urged that we either
return wholly to the common law rule, or eliminate the "trap" quality
of Probate Code section 125 in the manner done in 1965 by Wis-
consin.
With respect to taxation the provisions of the federal estate tax
are not subject to modification by state legislation. There is, never-
theless, one provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
deserves careful thought. By section 2041 (b) (1) of that Code, a gen-
eral power is defined as a power which is "exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors or creditors of his estate," with
certain stated exceptions. This definition has been borrowed, without
its tax exceptions, in the recent statutory revisions of New York,7 1
Wisconsin2 and Michigan. 3 It was also borrowed with the excep-
tions included for tax purposes in the California Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code section 13692 enacted in 1965.
For purposes of definition in a general statute on powers of ap-
pointment would it not be wise to use the same concept of a "gen-
at 594, and was based on Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1330-31, Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 72,
§ 22, at 179 (repealed 1874).
67 N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.1(a) (4) (McKinney 1967).
68 3 POWELL f 397 n.18 cites cases so holding from the Fifth Circuit and
from Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Mary-
land, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina and Texas.
This is the rule embodied in RESTATEVNT § 343. See also collection of
cases in Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 911 (1967).
69 47 Cal. 2d 200, 302 P.2d 301, noted in 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1168 (1956).
70 WIs. STAT. § 232.03 (1) (2) (1965). See generally Effland, Powers of
Appointment-The New Wisconsin Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 583, 589.
71 N.Y. ESTATE, PowERS & TRUST LAW § 10-3.2(b) (McKinney 1967).
72 Wis. STAT. § 232.01(4) (1965).
78 MxcH. STAT. § 26.155 (102) (h) (Supp. 1967).
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eral power" as is now used in the federal estate tax, in the California
inheritance tax and in the recently revised statutes of New York,
Wisconsin and Michigan? These states borrowed the wording of In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, section 2041(b) (1), without the excep-
tions needed for tax purposes in the federal estate and in the Cal-
ifornia inheritance tax statutes. A like simplification of form would
serve well in California.
The treatment of appointive assets under the California inheri-
tance tax has differed in five periods spanning the time from 1905 to
the present.7 4 This segment of the state's tax system was reviewed
with care, prior to the enactment 5 of the present form of the statute
in 1965. No reconsideration of this aspect of the California law on
powers of appointment is desirable at this time.
This survey of the statutory ingredient in the law of California
on powers of appointment has shown that California Civil Code sec-
tion 1060 (on releasability) is generally good, but needs minor changes;
that Probate Code section 125 (silent exercise of a power) deserves
either elimination or substantial curtailment; that the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, in defining the term "general power" uses language
which could profitably be incorporated in a general statute on pow-
ers; and that the California inheritance tax, completely revised in
1965, deserves to be left alone. The quantum of statutory departures
from the common law is not substantial.
The Need in California for a Fairly Inclusive Siatute
California is now in the position which, within the past 4 years,
has been met and handled in the states of New York (1964), Wiscon-
sin (1965) and Michigan (1967). In each of these states it has been
declared that it has the common law of powers, except as modified
by statute.76 These declarations are the exact equivalent of the
74 Estate of Newton, 35 Cal. 2d 830, 831, 221 P.2d 952, 952-53 (1950),
traced the treatments in the first four of these five periods.
75 Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1070, § 6, at 2716-19. These provisions constitute
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 13691-701.
76 The writer of this article drafted N.Y. Real Property Laws § 130, ch.
864, § 1, [1964] N.Y. Laws 2322, as follows:
"The common law of powers, both as embodied in sections of this article,
and as to topics left uncovered by the sections of this article, is established as
the law of this state, except as specifically modified by provisions in the sec-
tions of this article." (emphasis added). This, with verbal changes which are
no improvement, is now N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRusTs LAw § 10-1.1 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1967).
Wis. STAT. § 232.19 (1965) states:
"As to all matters within the scope of those sections of ch. 232 (Stat. 1963)
which have been repealed, and not within this chapter or any other applicable
statute, the common law is to govern." (emphasis added).
MIcH. STAT. § 26.155(119) (Supp. 1967) states:
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1935 California decision in Estate of Sloan.
7
When the writer was working on the New York problem in 1963,
the Temporary Commission on Estates, in a letter dated April 5, 1963,
directed the writer
not merely to restore the common law (with deviations) but to
spell out as far as feasible what the common law is.
The wisdom of this direction is evidenced by the following of its
dictates in the legislation of New York in 1964; in the New York Es-
tates, Powers and Trust Law, effective September 1, 1967; in the Wis-
consin legislation of 1965 and in the Michigan legislation of 1967.
There is no need to include in the statute a coverage of all the points
possibly litigable concerning powers of appointment. The bar and
the courts will be greatly helped, and the public interest will be
served, by a statute which does spell out the "common law of
California," on the core points as to which litigation can fairly be
anticipated. This will eliminate the need for expensive research into
the decisions of England and of our sister states as to the content of
the common law on powers. At present the Restatement of Property
can be regarded as probably a fair presentation of the common law,
but a careful lawyer will feel compelled to dig out the decisions and
to weigh their conflicting ideas. So also will the careful judge. A
declaratory statute will greatly minimize this wasteful process for
both the bar and the bench.
In the proposal which the writer submitted in 1967 to the Cal-
ifornia Law Revision Commission7 8 there are 32 sections. Two of
these embody the modifications in California Civil Code section 1060
(section 12) and in Probate Code section 125 (section 17), hereinbefore
discussed; one (section 1) embodies the general acceptance of the com-
mon law of powers, required by Estate of Sloan;79 23 (sections 2-8,
13-16, 19-30) are declaratory of the common law, including some
points heretofore passed on by the courts of this state; two (sections
31 and 32) concern the applicable law and severability; three (sec-
tions 9-11) deal with the rights of creditors of a donee;80 and one
"As to all matters not within this act or any other applicable statute, the
common law is to govern." (emphasis added).
These three recent statutes are discussed (as to New York) in Powell,
The New Powers of Appointment Act, 103 TausTs & ESTATES 807 (1964); Com-
ment, Powers of Appointment-The New York Revision, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
1289 (1965); (as to Wisconsin) Effland, Powers of Appointment--The New
Wisconsin Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 583; (as to Michigan) BROWDER, FIRST
ANxuAL REPORT, STUDY OF MICHIGAN STATUTES ON POWERS OF APPOINT=ENT
50-81 (1967).
77 7 Cal. App. 2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (discussed in text accompanying notes
27-29 supra).
78 This proposal is Appendix A to this article.
79 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
80 See text accompanying notes 82-90 infra.
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(section 18) substitutes the modem constructional preference for
exclusive powers for the anachronistic rule on this point applied in
Estate of Sloan.81  The remainder of this article consists of the rea-
sons for the four provisions last above mentioned.
Rights of Creditors of the Donee of a General Power
Historically, and traditionally, the appointee took directly from
the donor and not from the donee. Chief Justice Gibson, in a
Pennsylvania case of 1849, expressed this historical view thus:
There is such flagrant injustice in applying the bounty of a testator
to the benefit of those for whom it was not intended [the creditors of
the donee], that the mind revolts from it. An appointee derives title
immediately from the donor of the power, by the instrument in
which it was created; and consequently not under but paramount to
the appointor, by whom it was executed: by reason of which it is
impossible to conceive that the appointor's creditors have an equity.
A man who is employed to manage the conduit-pipe of another's
munificence, is authorized by a general power of disposal to turn the
stream of it to any person or point within the compass of his dis-
cretion; and his creditors have no right in justice or reason to con-
trol him performing his function because it was not assigned to him
as their trustee. It is the bounty of the testator, and not the prop-
erty of his steward, that is to be dispensed.
8 2
Despite the historical accuracy of Gibson's position, realities pre-
vailed over theory. The English chancellors developed what came to
be known as the "doctrine of equitable assets." This is reputed to
have been an effort "to foster credit" in a society where creditors
had much influence. Under this doctrine, if a debtor was the donee
of a general power, and he exercised it in favor of a volunteer,
his creditors could reach the appointive assets, in priority to his ap-
pointees, provided the debtor lacked other assets to pay the creditor.
8 3
This doctrine is embodied in the Restatement of Property as sound
common law doctrine.8 4 This is the doctrine which Mr. Justice Tray-
nor used as the basis for an analogy in 1940.85 It was an adequate,
but not a necessary basis for the 1956 decision in Estate of Masson.86
The doctrine of equitable assets was an improvement on the law
which existed before it, but it did not go far enough. The donee of
a general power, before its exercise, has substantially the equivalent of
full ownership. The Internal Revenue Code, since 1942, has required
that a donee having a general power to appoint include the appointive
assets in his gross estate.8 7 The California Revenue and Taxation
81 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra and notes 91-96 infra.
82 Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, 279-80 (1849).
83 3 POWELL q 389.
84 RESTATEMENT §§ 329, 330.
85 Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940).
86 142 Cal. App. 2d 510, 298 P.2d 619 (1956).
87 Revenue Act of 1942, § 811(f), 56 Stat. 942 (now INT. Rxv. CoDE or 1954,
§ 2041).
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Code was amended in 1965, so that a taxable inheritance occurs when-
ever a person takes either by the exercise or the nonexercise of a
general power.88 Thus, on death, both the federal and California
statutes treat a general power as the equivalent of full ownership.
If this is true as to taxes, why should it not also be true as to credi-
tors? The Federal Bankruptcy Act has taken this position as to all
general powers of the bankrupt presently exercisable at the moment
of bankruptcy.8 9 The statutes enacted in Minnesota (1943), in New
York (1964), in Wisconsin (1965), and in Michigan (1967), have ex-
tended this same rule to all creditors of the donee of a general power.90
88 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13696.
80 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (3) (1964) (originally enacted 1938). See also RE-
STATEMENT § 331.
90 Ch. 322, § 10 [1943] Minn. Laws 440, as amended, Ch. 206, § 1 [1947]
Minn. Laws (now Miu. STAT. § 502.70 (Supp. 1967)) provides:
"When a donee is authorized either to appoint to himself or to appoint
to his estate all or part of the property covered by a power of appointment,
a creditor of the donee, during the life of the donee, may subject to his claim
all property which the donee could then appoint to himself and, after the
death of the donee, may subject to his claim all property which the donee
could at his death have appointed to his estate, but only to the extent that
other property available for the payment of his claim is insufficient for such
payment. When a donee has exercised such a power by deed, the rules relat-
ing to fraudulent conveyances shall apply as if the property transferred to the
appointee had been owned by the donee. When a donee has exercised such
a power by will in favor of a taker without value or in favor of a creditor, a
creditor of the donee or a creditor of his estate may subject such property
to the payment of his claim, but only to the extent that other property avail-
able for the payment of the claim is insufficient for such payment."
Ch. 864, § 139 [1964] N.Y. Laws 1568, enacted the provision which now
appears in N.Y. ESTATE, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-7.2 (McKinney 1967). In
an earlier section (§ 10-3.2(b)) this statute used the language of INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b), defining a general power as one exercisable wholly
in favor of the donee, his estate, his creditors or creditors of his estate. It then
provides:
'"roperty covered by a general power of appointment which is presently
exercisable or of a postponed power which has become exercisable, is sub-
ject to the payment of the claims of creditors of the donee, his estate and
the expenses of administering his estate. It is immaterial whether the power
was created in the donee by himself or by some other person, or whether the
donee has or has not purported to exercise the power."
It will be noted that this statute is somewhat more favorable to creditors
than the Minnesota statute.
WIs. STAT. §§ 232.01(4), 232.17 (Supp. 1967) uses the Internal Revenue
Code definition of a general power (§ 232.01(4)) and then provides (§ 232.17)
a still broader ability of creditors to reach the appointive assets:
"232.17 Rights of Creditors of the donee.
"(1) General Policy. If the donee has either a general power or an
unclassified power which is unlimited as to permissible appointees except for
exclusion of the donee, his estate, his creditors and the creditors of his estate,
or a substantially similar exclusion, any interest which the donee has power
to appoint or has appointed is to be treated as property of the donee for pur-
poses of satisfying claims of his creditors, as provided in this section.
"(2) During lifetime of the donee. If the donee has an unexercised
power of the kinds specified in sub. (1), and he can presently exercise such
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The proposed statute for California, in sections 9-11, brings the state
abreast of modem realities, as has heretofore been done in four
sister states.
Exclusive vs. Nonexclusive Powers
There is one problem on which the California decision, purport-
edly based on the court's understanding of the common law, deviates
so markedly from today's general understanding of the common law,
that this proposed statute should provide a remedy. This problem
concerns only special powers. Estate of Sloan91 held that where, by
will, a father provided that if his son died before reaching the age of
30, the property should go to the heirs of the son as the son's will
directed; the son could not lawfully exercise the power by giving all
the assets to one maternal aunt, to the exclusion of two paternal
aunts, all three being "heirs" of the son at his death. This embodies
a power, any creditor of the donee may by appropriate proceedings reach any
interest which the donee could appoint, to the extent that the donee's indi-
vidual assets are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. Such an interest
is to be treated as property of the donee within ch. 273. If the donee has
exercised such a power, the creditor can reach the appointed interests to the
same extent that under the law relating to fraudulent conveyances he could
reach property which the donee has owned and transferred.
"(3) At death of the donee. If the donee has at the time of his death
a power of the kinds specified in sub. (1), whether or not he exercises the
power, any creditor of the donee may reach any interest which the donee
could have appointed or has appointed, to the extent that the claim of the
creditor has been filed and allowed in the donee's estate but not paid because
the assets of the estate are insufficient."
Micr. STAT. § 26.155(113) (Supp. 1967) provides:
"Sec. 113. (1) If the donee has a general power of appointment, any
interest which the donee has power to appoint or has appointed is to be
treated as property of the donee for the purposes of satisfying claims of his
creditors, as provided in this section.
"(2) If the donee has an unexercised'general power of appointment and
he can presently exercise such a power, any creditor of the donee may by
appropriate proceedings reach any interest which the donee could appoint,
to the extent that the donee's individual assets are insufficient to satisfy the
creditor's claim. If the donee has exercised the power, the creditor can reach
the appointed interests to the same extent that under the law relating to
fraudulent conveyances he could reach property which the donee has owned
and transferred.
"(3) If the donee has at the time of his death a general power of ap-
pointment, whether or not he exercises the power, the executor or other legal
representative of the donee may reach on behalf of creditors any interest
which the donee could have appointed to the extent that the claim of any
creditor has been filed and allowed in the donee's estate but not paid because
the assets of the estate are insufficient.
"(4) Under a general assignment by the donee, for the benefit of his
creditors, the assignee may exercise any right which a creditor of the donee
would have under subsection (2)."
91 7 Cal. App. 2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 27-29 supra).
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a constructional preference for the nonexclusionary power. It may,
perhaps, once have been good common law. The now long accepted
common law view is the direct opposite. Restatement of Property
section 360 is entitled 'Whether a Power is Exclusive or Non-Exclu-
sive." Its text is as follows:
The donee of a special power may, by an otherwise effective ap-
pointment, exclude one or more objects of the power from distribu-
tion of the property covered thereby unless the donor manifests a con-
trary intent.
It will be noted that this reverses the constructional preference stated
in Estate of Sloan, and creates a constructional preference in favor
of the donee's full liberty of choice among the permissible appoint-
ees. If the donor wishes, he can, by appropriate additional language,
lessen the donee's full liberty of choice. The many authorities on this
problem are cited and discussed in Powell on Real Property para-
graph 398.92 This same constructional preference for "exclusive"
powers is embodied in the recently drafted statutes of New York,
93
Wisconsin, 4 and Michigan.95
It is recommended that the proposed new statute include a sec-
tion bringing the California law into conformity with the modern
understanding of the common law on this point.90
Conclusion
The enactment of the proposed new statute on powers of ap-
pointment:
(1) Will eliminate slight difficulties in present California Civil
Code section 1060;
(2) Will greatly lessen the bad features of California Probate
Code section 125;
(3) Will substitute the modern constructional preference for
exclusive powers for the mistaken view of Estate of Sloan
on this point;
92 3 POWELL 398, at 378.49 states: "A special power can be either 'ex-
clusive' or 'nonexclusive.' This means that the donee, under the authority
conferred upon him by the donor, may be authorized either to give the
appointive assets wholly to one or more of the objects, excluding others of
the objects (in which case the power is said to be 'exclusive') or to give the
appointive assets in shares to be determined by the donee, but to some extent
giving something to every one of the permissible appointees (in which case
the power is said to be 'nonexclusive'). The constructional preference is for
the finding of exclusive powers [citing decisions from Kentucky, Maine, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania]."
93 N.Y. ESTATES, PowERs & TRusTs LAw § 10-6.5 (McKinney 1967).
94 Wis. STAT. § 232.07 (1965).
95 McH. STAT. § 26.155(107) (Supp. 1967).
96 See Appendix A, at § 18.
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(4) Will conform the treatment of creditors of the donee of a
general power to widely accepted modem views;
(5) Will spell out the content of the common law of powers on
many points, some of which have already been accepted in
California decisions; and will confirm the position accepted
in California since 1935 that the common law of powers is the
available reservoir on points not covered in statutes.
Appendix A
The Proposed Statute
Chapter- Powers of Appointment
Section 1. Common law of powers of appointment established, with excep-
tions.
2. Classification of powers of appointment; general and special.
3. Classification of powers of appointment as to time of exercise;
presently exercisable, testamentary and otherwise postponed.
4. Classification of powers of appointment; imperative and discre-
tionary.
5. Classification of powers of appointment; exclusive and nonex-
clusive.
6. Creation of a power of appointment.
7. Scope of the authority of the donee.
8. Creditors of the donee; special power.
9. Creditors of the donee; general power presently exercisable.
10. Creditors of the donee; power subject to a condition.
11. Creditors of the donee; general power not presently exercisable.
12. Release of a power of appointment.
13. Contract to appoint; power presently exercisable.
14. Contract to appoint; power not presently exercisable.
15. Exercise of a power; prerequisite formalities.
1. Capacity of a donee.
2. Conformity to donor's directions, with exception.
3. Disregard of donor's insufficient requirements.
4. Disregard of donor's excessive requirements.
5. Specific reference to power where donor has required it.
6. Required consents, with mitigations.
7. Required uniting by two or more donees, with mitigations.
8. Equitable power to remedy defect in formalities.
16. Exercise of a power; instrument executed before the power was
created.
17. Exercise of a power; what constitutes.
18. Exercise of a power; two or more permissible appointees.
19. Exercise of a power; permissible types of appointment under a
general power.
20. Exercise of a power; permissible types of appointment under a
special power.
21. Exercise of a power; fraud on special power.
22. Exercise of a power; void as to excess only.
23. Exercise of a power; lapse.
24. Rule against perpetuities; time at which permissible period be-
gins.
25. Rule against perpetuities; facts to be considered.
26. Imperative power; effectuation.
27. Appointment to a trustee on a trust which fails; capture.
28. Appointment assuming control of the appointive assets for all
purposes; capture.
29. Ineffective appointment; effect of.
30. Irrevocability; creation, exercise or release of a power.
31. Applicable law.
32. Constitutionality; severability clause.
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Section 1. Common law of powers of appointment established, with
exceptions.
The common law as to powers of appointment is the law of
California, both as to topics dealt with in this chapter and as to
topics left uncovered thereby, except as specifically modified by
provisions in the sections of this chapter and of the Revenue and
Taxation Code of this state.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is substantially identical with N.Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAw § 130 (McKinney Supp. 1967), adopted by ch. 864, [1964] N.Y. Laws
2322 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. 1964]; with WIs. STAT. § 232.19 (Supp.
1967), adopted by ch. 52, § 5, [1965-1] Wis. Laws 65 [hereinafter cited as
Wis. 1965]; and with MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19 (1967) (Powers of Appoint-
ment Act) [hereinafter cited as MICH. 1967]. It avoids the loose and
ambiguous language of N.Y. ESTATES, PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-1.1
(McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as E.P.T.L.].
Section 2. Classification of powers of appointment; general and
special.
1. A power of appointment is general to the extent that it is
exercisable wholly in favor of the donee, his estate, his creditor or
creditors of his estate.
2. All other powers of appointment are special.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 133; and is very simi-
lar both to Wis. 1965, § 232.01(4) and to McH. 1967, § 2 (H). It departs
from the common law, as embodied in the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 320 (1940) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] by employing the defini-
tional language of INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (federal estate
tax law), which, in 1965, was incorporated into CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 13692. The exceptions stated in these two tax statutes have an impor-
tance significant only in tax problems. The omission of these exceptions
from this draft follows the example of N.Y. 1964, Wis. 1965, and MIcH.
1967.
Section 3. Classification of powers of appointment as to time of
exercise; presently exercisable, testamentary and otherwise post-
poned.
1. A power of appointment is presently exercisable whenever the
donor has not manifested an intent that its exercise is postponed.
2. A power of appointment is testamentary whenever the donor
has manifested an intent that it is to be exercised only by a will of
the donee.
3. A power of appointment which is neither presently exercis-
able nor testamentary is a postponed power.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 134. It is similar to
MIcH. 1967, § 2(L). It avoids the muddy wording of E.P.T.L. § 10-3.3.
It follows the common law as embodied in RESTATEMENT § 321.




1. A power of appointment is imperative when the donor has
manifested an intent that the donee has a duty to exercise it. Such a
duty can exist even though the donee has the privilege of selecting
some and excluding others of the designated permissible appointees.
2. A power of appointment is discretionary when it is not
imperative within the terms of subsection 1 of this section. The
donee of a discretionary power is privileged to exercise, or not to
exercise the power as he chooses.
AUTHoR's NOTE: This is substantially similar to N.Y. 1964, § 135 and to
E.P.T.L. § 10-3.4. It follows the suggestion in RESTATEMENT § 320, Special
Note, namely that the term "powers in trust" has too many different
meanings to make it a useful term. As to the consequences which flow
from a power being "mandatory," see section 26 infra.
Section 5. Classification of powers of appointment; exclusive and
nonexclusive.
1. A power of appointment is exclusive if it is a special power
and if it may be exercised in favor of one or more of the permissible
appointees to the exclusion of the others.
2. A power of appointment is nonexclusive when it is not ex-
clusive within the terms of subsection 1 of this section.
AuToR's NoTE: This is roughly similar to E.P.T.L. § 10-3.2 (2) (d) and
(e). This definition is important as a basis for the later section 18 in this
statute dealing with the constructional preference for exclusive powers,
which embodies the common law of RESTATEMENT § 360.
Section 6. Creation of a power of appointment.
The donor of a power of appointment:
(a) must be a person capable of transferring the interest in prop-
erty as to which the power relates; and
(b) must have executed the instrument claimed to create the
power in the manner required by law for such an instrument; and
(c) must manifest an intent to confer the power on a person
capable of holding the interest in property as to which the power
relates; and
(d) cannot nullify or alter the rights of creditors of the donee, as
defined in the succeeding sections of this chapter, by any language in
the instrument creating the power, purporting to give to the interest
of such donee a spendthrift character.
Au T o's NOTE: This is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 136. Subsections (a)
and (b) are substantially like MxcH. 1967, § 3. Subsections (a)-(c) are
clearly present law both in California and at common law. See RESTATE-
MENT § 323. Subsection (d) is a point not heretofore considered in Cali-
fornia. The position it takes was taken in N.Y. 1964, § 136 and E.P.T.L.
§ 10-4.1(4). It prevents a spread of the spendthrift trust idea and is
necessary to prevent Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (7) (1958) from
applying.
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Section 7. Scope of the authority of the donee.
The scope of the authority of the donee to determine appointees
and to select the time and manner of the appointment or appoint-
ments is unlimited except as the donor effectively manifests a con-
trary intention.
AuTHoR's NoTE: This embodies the common law rule of RESTATEmENT
§ 324 and is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964, § 137 and E.P.T.L.
§ 10-5.1.
Section 8. Creditors of the donee; special power.
Property covered by a special power of appointment cannot be
subjected to payment of the claims of creditors of the donee, or of
his estate or to the expenses of the administration of his estate.
AuTHoR's NoTE: This is sound common law. See RESTATEMENT § 326.
Since, by definition of a special power (section 2 (2) supra) the donee of
such a power has nothing comparable to ownership of the appointive
assets, it is reasonable to bar his creditors from reaching the appointive
assets. This section as proposed is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 138 and with
E.P.T.L. § 10-7.1. WIs. 1965, § 232.17(1) goes farther in giving creditors
of a donee power to reach the appointive assets, whenever the power "is
unlimited as to permissible appointees except for exclusion of the donee,
his estate, his creditors and the creditors of his estate, or a substantially
similar exclusion." This extension of the rights of creditors of the donee
in the case of some special powers is not believed to be worth the com-
plexity thereby introduced into the law. Furthermore, limitations within
the proposed extension are not likely of occurrence.
Section 9. Creditors of the donee; general power presently exer-
cisable.
Property covered by a general power of appointment which is,
or has become, presently exercisable, is subject to the payment of the
claims of creditors of the donee, his estate and the expenses of ad-
ministering his estate. It is immaterial whether the power was cre-
ated in the donee by himself, or by some other person. It is also
immaterial whether the donee has, or has not purported to exercise
the power, and whether the power originally had been exercisable
only by will.
AuTHoa's NOTE: This is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964, § 139;
E.P.T.L. § 10-7.2; Wis. 1965, § 232.17(1); and MIcH. 1967, § 13. It is
largely identical with ch. 322 [1943] Minn. Laws 439, enacting MnMN.
STAT. § 502.70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MAw. 1943].
This is a departure from the common law as embodied in RESTATE-
MENT §§ 327-30. When a rower to appoint is both general and presently
exercisable, the donee has, in substance, the equivalent of ownership as
to the appointive assets. Neither the traditional rule that the "appointee
takes from the donor" nor the English doctrine of equitable assets should
prevent the creditors of such a donee from reaching the appointive assets
for the satisfaction of their established claims. Neither is there any jus-
tification for retaining the anachronistic remnant of the common law (as
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Mich., Minn., and Wis.) that the appointive assets can be reached "only
to the extent that other property available for the payment of his claim
is insufficient for such payment."
Section 10. Creditors of the donee; power subject to a condition.
A general power of appointment may be created subject to a
condition precedent. Until such condition is fulfilled, the rule stated
in section 9 is inapplicable.
AuTHOR's NoTE: This is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964, § 140, and
with E.P.T.L. § 10-7.3. It is, perhaps, unnecessary but serves some pre-
cautionary purposes.
Section 11. Creditors of the donee; general power not presently
exercisable.
Property covered by a general power of appointment, which, by
the terms of its creation was made not presently exercisable, can be
subjected to the payment of the claims of creditors of the donee, or of
his estate, or to the expenses of the administration of his estate
(a) if the power was created by the donee in favor of him-
self; or
(b) if the power has become presently exercisable in ac-
cordance with the terms of the creating instrument.
AuTHOR's NoTE: This is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964, § 141, and
with E.P.T.L. § 10-7.4, except that the New York statutes do not apply to
testamentary powers which have become presently exercisable by the
death of the donee. This writer opposed the exclusion of testamentary
powers which had become presently exercisable, on the ground that the
appointive assets have come under the complete power of disposition by
the debtor donee and hence should be treated exactly the same as are
the other assets of such decedent. This is the sound position taken in
Wis. 1965, § 232.17 (3), and in McH. 1967, § 13(3).
The provision in subsection (a) is good common law. See RESTATE-
ZMT § 328. The provision in subsection (b) is a reasonable corollary of
section 9 supra.
Section 12. Release of a power of appointment.
1. Any power, which is exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or
will, or otherwise, whether general or special, other than a power*
which is imperative, is releasable, either with or without considera-
tion, by written instrument signed by the donee and delivered as
hereinafter provided unless the instrument creating the power pro-
vides otherwise.
2. A power which is releasable may be released with respect to
the whole or any part of the property subject to such power and
may also be released in such manner as to reduce or limit the persons
or objects, or classes of persons or objects, in whose favor such power
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would otherwise be exercisable. No release of a power shall be
deemed to make imperative a power which was not imperative prior
to such release, unless the instrument of release expressly so provides;
nor shall any release of a power be permissible when the result of
the release is an inter vivos exercise of a solely testamentary power.
3. Such release may be delivered to any of the following:
(a) any person specified for such purpose in the instrument
creating the power;
(b) any trustee of the property to which the power relates;
(c) any person, other than the donee, who could be ad-
versely affected by an exercise of the power;
(d) the county recorder of the county in which the donee
resides, or has a place of business, or in which the deed, will or
other instrument creating the power is filed, and from the time
of filing the same for record, notice is imparted to all persons of
the contents thereof.
4. All releases heretofore made which substantially comply
with the foregoing requirements are hereby validated. The enactment
of this section shall not impair, nor be construed to impair, the
validity of any release heretofore made.
AuTHoR's Nor: This section is identical with CAL. CIV. CODS § 1060,
enacted by Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 318, § 1, at 777, except in two particulars:
(1) At the point marked with an asterisk the words "in trust" have been
omitted, on the ground that they are fully covered by the phrase
"which is imperative."
(2) The underlined last 25 words of subsection 2 have been inserted for
reasons set forth in the text accompanying footnotes 63 and 64 supra.
It is believed that these words are necessary to effect the common
law rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 346 (a) and used as the basis
for the results in Childs v. Gross, 41 Cal. App. 2d 680, 107 P.2d 424
(1940), and Briggs v. Briggs, 122 Cal. App. 2d 766, 265 P.2d 587 (1954).
Section 13. Contract to appoint; power presently exercisable.
The donee of a power to appoint presently exercisable, whether
general or special, can effectively contract to make an appointment,
if neither the contract, nor the promised appointment, confers a bene-
fit upon a person who is not a permissible appointee under the power.
AuTHoR's NOTS: This is accepted common law. See RESTATEMENT § 339.
It is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 145; E.P.T.L. § 10-5.2; and mcm 1967,
§ 10(1).
Section 14. Contract to appoint; power not presently exercisable.
The donee of a power to appoint which is not presently exer-
cisable cannot effectively contract to make an appointment. If the
promise to make an appointment is not performed, the promisee can-
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not obtain either specific performance or damages, but he can obtain
restitution of the value given by him for the promise.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is accepted common law. See RESTATEMENT § 340.
It is identical with N.Y. 1964, § 146(1); E.P.T.L. § 10-5.3; and MicH. 1967,
§ 10(2). It intentionally omits N.Y. 1964, § 146(2) in order to conform
to California decisions. See note appended to section 12, supra, as to the
25 words proposed for insertion in section 2 of present CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1060.
Section 15. Exercise of a power; prerequisite formalities.
1. An effective exercise of a power of appointment can be made
only by a donee capable of transferring the interest in property to
which the power relates.
AUTHoR's NOTE: This is accepted common law. RESTATEMENT § 345. It
is substantially identical with MICH. 1967, § 5(1); MXNN. 1943, § 502.66;
and Wis. 1965, § 232.05(1).
2. An effective exercise of a power of appointment can be made
only by a written instrument which complies with the requirements,
if any, of the creating instrument as to the manner, time and condi-
tions of the exercise of the power, except that a power stated to be
exercisable only by deed is also exercisable by a written will executed
as required by law.
AUTHOR's NOTE: Down to the "except" clause, this is accepted common
law. See RESTATEMENT § 346. Without the "except" clause, this is sub-
stantially identical with Wis. 1965, § 232.05 (2). The rule embodied in the
"except" clause first appeared in MINN. 1943, § 502.64, and has been the
law in that state for 24 years. A similar "except" clause appears in N.Y.
1964, § 148(3) and in McH. 1967, § 5(2). Few conveyors prescribe that
a power of appointment can be exercised only by an inter vivos instru-
ment. If and when such a prescription is encountered, it is reasonable to
say that "all purposes of substance which the donor could have had in
mind are accomplished by a will of the donee." The RESTATEMENT § 347,
comment b, comes very close to adopting the "except" clause as sound
common law.
3. An effective exercise of a power of appointment can be made
by an instrument conforming to the requirements of subsection 2,
when the donor has authorized the power to be exercised by an instru-
ment not sufficient in law to pass the appointive assets, and such
clause does not invalidate the power.
AuTHoR's NOTE: This is substantially identical with McH. 1967, § 5(3)
and with N.Y. 1964, § 148(1).
4. An effective exercise of a power of appointment can be made
by an instrument conforming to the requirements of subsection 2,
without observance of additional formalities directed by the donor to
be observed in its exercise.
AuTHoR's NOTE: This is substantially identical with MNN. 1943, § 502.65;
N.Y. 1964, § 148 (2); and E.P.T.L. § 10-6.2 (2). It is more liberal than the
common law rule embodied in RESTATEMENT § 346.
5. An effective exercise of a power of appointment can only be
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made by an instrument which contains a specific reference to the
power or to the instrument creating the power, if the instrument
creating the power has so explicitly directed.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This subsection is a part of the proposed modification
of CAL. PROB. CODE § 125, set forth in section 17 (d) infra. It embodies the
provision of Wis. 1965, § 232.03 (1) and of the last sentence in IIcH. 1967,
§ 4.
6. An effective exercise of a power of appointment, which, by
the terms of its creating instrument requires the consent of the
donor, or of some other person, can only be made when the re-
quired consent is contained in the instrument of exercise or in a
separate written instrument, signed, in each case by the person or
persons whose consents are required. If any person whose consent
is required dies or becomes legally incapable of consenting, the power
may be exercised by the donee, without the consent of that person,
unless the creating instrument explicitly forbids.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This embodies the rule first stated in Minm. 1943,
§ 502.68. It was also adopted in N.Y. 1964, § 150; E.P.T.L. § 10-6.4; Wis.
1965, § 232.05(3); and MIcH. 1967, § 5(4).
7. An effective exercise of a power of appointment created in
favor of two or more donees, can only be made when all of the
donees unite in its exercise; but if one or more of the donees dies,
becomes legally incapable of exercising the power, or releases the
power, the power may be exercised by the others, unless the creating
instrument explicitly forbids.
A-UTHOR'S NOTE: This embodies the rule first stated in MiUn. 1943,
§ 502.67. It was also adopted in N.Y. 1964, § 166; E.P.T.L. § 10-6.7; Wis.
1965, § 232.05 (4); and in MIcH. 1967, § 5 (5).
8. None of the provisions in the subsections of this section shall
be construed in any way to modify the power of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to remedy a defective exercise of an imperative power
of appointment.
AuTHOR's NOTE: This is a precautionary provision suggested by the first
sentence in N.Y. 1964, § 148, which is retained in E.P.T.L. § 10-6.2. The
writer believes it to be a desirable provision. Perhaps it should be broad-
ened by omitting the word "imperative." With that omission it would
be closer to the rule of the common law as expressed in RESTATEMENT
§ 347.
Section 16. Exercise of a power; instrument executed before the
power was created.
A power existing at the donee's death, but created after the exe-
cution of his will is effectively exercised thereby if the will is an
otherwise effective appointment, unless
(a) the donor manifests an intent that the power may not
be exercised by a will previously executed, or
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(b) the donee manifests an intent not to exercise a power
subsequently acquired.
AuTHoR's NOTE: This is accepted common law. See RESTATEMENT § 344.
It is also required by the decision in California Trust Co. v. Ott, 59 Cal.
App. 2d 715, 140 P.2d 79 (1943).
Section 17. Exercise of a power; what constitutes.
An effective exercise of a power of appointment by its donee re-
quires a manifestation of the donee's intent to exercise such power.
Such a manifestation exists when
(a) the donee, in a deed or will, declares, in substance, that
he exercises this specific power, or all powers that he has; or
(b) the donee, sufficiently identifying property covered by
the power, executes a deed or leaves a will, purporting to convey
such property; or
(c) the donee includes in his will, pecuniary gifts or a re-
siduary gift or both which, when read with reference to the
property which he owned and the circumstances existing at the
time of the formulation of the will, justifies a finding that the
donee understood that he was disposing of the appointive assets;
or
AuTHoR's NOTE: The first three clauses of this section 17 are all accepted
common law. See RESTATEMENT §§ 342, 343. They are also required by
California decisions. See Reed v. Hollister, 44 Cal. App. 533, 186 P. 819
(1919); Childs v. Gross, 41 Cal. App. 2d 680, 107 P.2d 424 (1940). These
rules are embodied in N.Y. 1964, § 147(1) (2) and (3); E.P.T.L. § 10-6.1
(1) (2) and (3); Wis. 1965, § 232.03 (2); and MICH. 1967, § 4.
(d) the donee has a general power exercisable by will, with
no gift in default in the creating instrument and with no require-
ment in the instrument creating the power that the donee make a
specific reference to the power as required in Section 15(5) of
this chapter, and the donee includes in his will a residuary
clause, or other general language purporting to dispose of all the
donee's property of the kind covered by the power, and no
interest is manifested, either expressly or by necessary infer-
ence, not to exercise the power.
AUTHoR's NOTE: This fourth clause is the proposed substitute for CAL.
PROB. CODE § 125. It embodies the rule of Wis. 1965, § 232.03 (2). See
text of this article accompanying notes 65-70 supra. The complete re-
versal of the rule stated in CAL. PRos. CODE § 125, involving a return to
the common law rule, would be accomplished by the complete omission
of clause (d). Intermediate positions would omit the words "with no
gift in default in the creating instrument," as is done in MicH. 1967, § 4,
or by omitting both the above quoted phrases and also the word "general,"
as is done in N.Y. 1964, § 147 (4). If it is decided generally to retain the
rule of CAL. PROS. CODE § 125, unchanged, clause (d) will require redraft-
ing, with or without the reference to section 15(5) of this statute. This
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writer recommends the substantial return to the common law rule, which
is accomplished by the submitted wording of this clause (d).
Section 18. Exercise of a power; two or more permissible appointees.
The donee of any special power of appointment may appoint the
whole or any part of the appointive assets to any one or more of the
permissible appointees and exclude others; except to the extent that
the donor specifies either a minimum share or amount, or a maxi-
mum share or amount, to be appointed to one or more of the per-
missible appointees, in which cases the exercise of the power must
conform to such specifications.
AuTHoR's NoTE: This section embodies the common law constructional
preference for exclusive powers as embodied in RESTATEMENT § 360. It is
.also contrary to the, erroneous finding of Estate of Sloan, 7 Cal. App. 2d
319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935), as to what was the common law rule. It is
phrased like Wis. 1965, § 232.07 and is more exact in its coverage than
either N.Y. 1964, § 151 or MIcH. 1967, § 7, although the modern preference
for exclusive powers is expressed in both of the statutes.
Section 19. Exercise of a power; permissible types of appointment
under a general power.
The donee of a general power of appointment can effectively
(a) appoint at one time or make several partial appointments at
different times, where the power is exercisable inter vivos;
(b) appoint present or future interests or both;
(c) make appointments subject to conditions or charges;
(d) make appointments subject to otherwise lawful restraints
on the alienation of the appointed interest;
(e) make appointments in trust;
(f) make an appointment by creating a new power of appoint-
ment.
AuTHOR's NoTE: This section embodies the rules of the common law as
found in RESTATEMENT §§ 356-57: No comparable section is found in the
statutes of the other states, namely N.Y. 1964, WIs. 1965, and MIcH. 1967.
The section merely makes it clear that, under a general power to appoint,
the donee has exactly the same freedom of disposition as he has with
respect to his own assets.
Section 20. Exercise of a power; permissible types of appointment
under a special power.
The donee of a special power of appointment can effectively
make any one or more of the types of appointment permissible for
the donee of a general power, under the rule stated in the next pre-
ceding section, provided only that the persons benefited by any such
appointment are exclusively persons who are permissible appointees
under the terms of the special power.
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AuTHoR's NoTE: This section embodies the rules of the common law as
found in RESTATEMENT §§ 358-59, except that it authorizes the donee of a
special power to exercise the power by creating a general power of ap-
pointment in a permissible object. Since the donee is empowered to ap-
point outright to one of the permissible objects of the special power, it
is irrational to refuse to allow him to give such a person a general power
to appoint. In so far as the RESTATEMENT § 359(3) hesitated to take this
position, its irrationality is corrected in this section for California. See
3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 398 n.76 (1967).
Section 21. Exercise of a power; fraud on special power.
If the donee of a special power exercises his power in favor of a
permissible object, but, directly or indirectly, such appointment was
intended to benefit a nonobject, to any extent, the exercise of the
power is ineffective.
AuTHOR's NOTE: This section is a corollary of the rule stated in section
20. It is an aspect of the common law which was treated at length in
RESTATEMENT §§ 352-55. Attempts by a donee of a special power to frus-
trate the desire of the donor that the a'ppointive assets shall be devoted
exclusively to the class of objects designated, or else pass to the takers
in default, deserves protection. The decision in Home v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1948), requires recognition of this
rule in this statute. The leading case-on the topic is Matter of Carroll,
153 Misc. 649, 275 N.Y.S. 911 (Sur. Ct. 1934), modified, 247 App. Div. 11,
286 N.Y.S. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1936), rev'd, 274 N.Y. 288, 8 N.E.2d 864 (1937).
Section 22. Exercise of a power; void as to excess only.
An exercise of a power of appointment is not void solely because
it was more extensive than was authorized by the power. Interests
created by such an exercise are valid, so far as is permitted by the
terms of the power.
AuTHOR's NOTE: This section embodies the desirable salvaging rule of
N.Y. 1964, § 152 and E.P.T.L. § 10-6.6(1). No comparable rule is found
in the RESTATEMENT or in Wis.. 1965 or MicH. 1967.
Section 23. Exercise of a power; lapse.
If an attempted exercise of a power is ineffective because of the
death of an appointee prior to the effective date of the exercise, the
appointment is to be effectuated, if possible, by applying the provi-
sions of Probate Code section 92, as though the appointive assets were
property of the appointor, except that the statute shall in no case
pass property to a nonobject of a special power.
AuTHOR's NOTE: This section embodies the ideas of the RESTATEMENT
§§ 349-50, broadened to cover special powers, by employing the language
of MIcH. 1967, § 20. It is recommended that the subject of lapse be dealt
with in this statute in the broadened form proposed.
Section 24. Rule against perpetuities; time at which permissible
period begins.
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The permissible period under the applicable rule against per-
petuities begins
(a) in the case of an instrument exercising a general power
of appointment presently exercisable on the effective date of the
instrument of exercise; and
(b) in all other situations, at the time of the creation of the
power. The rule of this clause applies to the exercise of a general
testamentary power.
AuTHOR's NoTE: This section embodies the common law rule as stated
in RESTATEMENT §§ 391-92. It is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964,
§ 154; E.P.T.L. § 10-8.1(a); and MIcH. 1967, § 14. As to general testa-
mentary powers, it follows the widely accepted American rule, as dis-
tinguished from the English rule, recently accepted in the Rhode Island
decision of Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, - R.I. -, 220 A.2d 517
(1966). See also collection of cases in 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
fI 788 (1962).
The rule concerning the time at which the permissible period begins
to run when the creator of a trust has reserved an unqualified power to
revoke (N.Y. 1964, § 155) is omitted because it is outside the field of
powers of appointment.
Section 25. Rule against perpetuities; facts to be considered.
When the permissible period under the applicable rule against
perpetuities begins at the time of the creation of a power of appoint-
ment with respect to interests sought to be created by an exercise of
the power, facts and circumstances existing at the effective date of
the instrument exercising the power shall be taken into account in
determining the validity of interests created by the instrument exer-
cising the power.
AuTHOR's NoTE: This is an accepted rule of the common law. See
RESTATEMENT § 392(a). The rule began with Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass.
514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918), and has gained acceptance in many common
law states, including Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. The section is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964,
§ 157; E.P.T.L. § 10-8.3; and MIcH. 1967, § 17. It is also the rule hereto-
fore applied in California. See Estate of Bird, 225 Cal. App. 2d 196, 37
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964).
Section 26. Imperative power; effectuation.
Where an imperative power of appointment
(a) confers on its donee a right of selection, and the donee
dies without having exercised the power, its exercise must be
adjudged for the benefit equally of all the persons designated as
permissible appointees;
(b) has been exercised defectively, either wholly or in part by
the donee, its proper execution may be adjudged in favor of the
person or persons purportedly benefited by the defective exer-
cise;
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(c) has been so created as to confer on a person the right to com-
pel the exercise of the power in his favor, its proper exercise may
be adjudged in favor of such person, his assigns, his creditors and
the committee of his person.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This section undertakes to encompass the general con-
sequences flowing from the imperative (or trust) character of the power.
It is modeled on N.Y. 1964, § 153 and it is materially less complex than
E.P.T.L. § 10-6.8. It is, nevertheless, believed to be adequate for the
purposes of this statute.
Section 27. Appointment to a trustee on a trust which fails; capture.
When the donee of a general power of appointment appoints to a
trustee upon a trust which fails, there is a resulting trust in favor
of the donee or of his estate, unless either the donor or the donee
manifests an inconsistent intent.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This section embodies the common law rule of "cap-
ture." See RESTATEUMNT § 365(2). The authorities supporting this rule
from England, Illinois and Massachusetts are collected in 3 R. PowELL,
REAL PROPEaRTY 400 n.35 (1967). There are no holdings on this problem
outside of the three jurisdictions named. No mention of the problem is
found in the recent statutes of Michigan, New York and Wisconsin.
Section 28. Appointment assuming control of the appointive assets
for all purposes; capture.
When the donee of a general power of appointment makes an
ineffective appointment not within the rule of section 27, but which
manifests the intent of the donee to assume control of the affected
appointive assets, for all purposes and not only for the limited pur-
pose of giving effect to the expressed appointment, there is a resulting
trust in favor of the donee or of his estate, unless the donor mani-
fests a contrary intent.
AuTHOR's NOTE: This section involves the second branch of the common
law rule of "capture." See RESTATEMENT § 365 (3). The authorities sup-
porting this rule from England, Illinois, Maryland and Massachusetts are
collected in 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 400 nn.36-39 (1967). There
are no holdings on this problem outside of the four jurisdictions named.
No mention of the problem is found in the recent statutes of Michigan,
New York and Wisconsin.
Section 29. Ineffective appointment; effect of.
Where the donee of a discretionary power of appointment re-
leases the entire power, or, ineffectively makes an appointment which
is not within the rules of Section 27 or Section 28, the appointive
assets pass to the person or persons, if any, named by the donor as
takers in default, and if there are none such, revert to the donor.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is accepted common law. See RESTATEMENT
§ 365(1). It is also the rule adopted in California by Estate of Baird, 120
Cal. App. 2d 219, 260 P.2d 1052 (1953); 135 Cal. App. 2d 333, 287 P.2d
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365 (1955), with the desirable result of minimizing the expenditure for
taxes, fiduciary fees and lawyer's fees by the estate of the donee.
Section 30. Irrevocability; creation, exercise or release of a power.
The creation, exercise or release of a power of appointment is
irrevocable unless the power to revoke is reserved in the instrument
creating, exercising or releasing the power.
AuTnoR's NoTE: This section is substantially identical with N.Y. 1964,
§ 144 and E.P.T.L. § 10-9.1. It is worded exactly the same as McH. 1967,
§ 9 and is very similar to Wis. 1965, § 232.11. It embodies the common
law as stated in RESTATEMENT § 366.
Section 31. Applicable law.
To whatever extent the law existing at the time of the creation
of a power and the law existing at the time of the release or exercise
of a power or at the time of the assertion of a right embodied in a
provision of this chapter shall differ, the law of the State of California
existing at the time of such release, exercise or assertion of a right
shall control.
AuTHoa's NOTE: This section keeps the law of powers abreast of cur-
rent statutes not only as to powers but also as to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the rule as to accumulations and the rule as to lapse. It
performs the same functions as are partially performed by N.Y. 1964,
§§ 156, 158; E.P.T.L. §§ 10-8.2, 10-8.4; Wis. 1965, § 232.21; and McH. 1967,
§ 22.
Section 32. Constitutionality; severability clause.
AuTHOR's NOTE: A severability clause is always desirable. It is not
presented here in draft form, as its form should be identical with that
heretofore used by the Law Revision Commission.
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